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Abstract 
Counterterrorism strategies that mainly rely on hard power have long been used to defeat 
terrorism. In recent years, governments have begun incorporating soft power approaches not 
as a substitute, but as a complementary strategy to be applied alongside hard power 
approaches. Disengagement and deradicalization programs are important components of soft 
power approaches, and are regarded as significant contributors to traditional counterterrorism 
methods. In this paper, we analyze a locally developed counterterrorism program in Turkey, 
which resulted in the disengagement and deradicalization of hundreds of militants.  
In this paper we present an examination of a pilot program that focused on applying 
individual disengagement and deradicalization counterterrorism measures that was conducted 
by the Adana Police Department in Turkey between 2009 and 2015. This program was 
designed to reach out to the members of extremist groups and their families for the purpose of 
persuading them to disengage from their groups, change their radical mindsets, and help them 
reintegrate into society. We also discuss how the change in the government’s counterterrorism 
strategy from one which prioritizes the use of soft power approaches to another, which mostly 
utilizes the hard power approach, and almost completely discards the soft power method, 
influenced the implementation of the program. 
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Individual Deradicalization and Disengagement 
Deradicalization refers to “the process of abandoning an extremist worldview and 
concluding that it is not acceptable to use violence to effect social change” (Rabasa, 
Pettyjhon, Ghez, & Boucek, 2010, p. 1). In short, it is a change in values and attitudes 
(Gjelsvik & Bjorgo, 2012). It can be described as the opposite of radicalization (Demant, 
Slootman, Buijs, & Tillie, 2008). Therefore, it is a process of renouncing radical thoughts. 
Ashour (2009) defines it as delegitimizing the use of violence for political goals, and moving 
forward to a worldview that promotes  social change through social, political, or economic 
channels, rather than utilizing violence.  
Radicalization is a gradual process individuals go through, consisting of various phases, 
and ultimately the adoption of a worldview which justifies the use of violence (see Borum, 
2003; Moghaddam, 2005). Demant et al. (2008) argued that the motivations that drive the 
process of radicalization should be well-understood in order to reverse the process. They 
added that deradicalization takes place when an individual’s motivations are no longer 
consistent with the group’s ideology. They further claimed that people’s view of violence that 
they have when they first join an extremist group may change over time. That view can 
mature from a romantic image to a more realistic one, when they encounter actual violence 
(Demant et al., 2008).  
Although some scholars see disengagement as a form of deradicalization (see Demant et 
al., 2008), these two strategies are usually regarded as different processes. While 
deradicalization is a shift from an ideology, which justifies the use of violence, to a new belief 
system, which embrace mainstream values, disengagement is simply a withdrawal from an 
extremist group (Rabasa et al., 2010). Although these two concepts are closely linked, one 
does not necessarily generate the other (Horgan, 2009). They may unfold in different 
sequences, or one can occur without the other (Gjelsvik & Bjorgo, 2012). Reinares (2011) 
claimed that disengagement is not necessarily an indicator of deradicalization. Accordingly, 
an individual who disengaged from a terrorist organization can keep his or her radical views. 
Clubb (2009) describes the situation in which the disengagement depends on receiving 
something in return, and is not accompanied by deradicalization as “conditional 
disengagement”. Those who disengage from an extremist group as a result of expecting a 
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may return to their former group when their cost-benefit calculus undergoes a change (Hoeft, 
2015). As Schmid (2013) points out, disengagement often occurs without deradicalization. 
However, scholars also argue that deradicalization can bring about disengagement. For 
instance, Demant et al. (2008) suggest that renouncing a radical ideology can result in the 
cessation of radical actions. Thus, deradicalization is expected to induce disengagement. 
Some scholars believe that a militant should first be disengaged from the extremist group in 
order to be deradicalized. In this vein, Hoeft (2015) regarded disengagement as a necessary 
prerequisite for deradicalization.  
Rabasa et al. (2010) identified three types of commitment to a group: affective, pragmatic, 
and ideological3. They argued that while affective commitment is an emotional attachment to 
the group, pragmatic commitment is related to those factors that encourage an individual to 
stay in the group, such as material rewards, and the factors that discourage them from 
disengaging, such as punishment. Ideological commitment, on the other hand, refers to the 
ideological components that justify the group members’ behaviors and beliefs, and is based on 
the ideology of the group. The degree of commitment to a group that has been made by an 
individual is a key factor that determines the likelihood of disengagement (Rabasa et al., 
2010). Disengagement occurs when one loses one’s attachments with the organization. 
According to Demant et al. (2008), disappointing experiences with the group may decrease 
the emotional attachment that an individual have with the group. They added that people’s 
ideological attachment may wane when they begin to doubt the ideology of the group. Finally, 
finding a better alternative can help to break the pragmatic attachments and to provide a basis 
for disengagement (Demant et al., 2008).  
According to Horgan (Tore Bjorgo & Horgan, 2009), disengagement can result from an 
disillusionment either arising from a disagreement over the ideology, or the tactics of the 
group, or arising from a mismatch between the expectations of a party and the realities. It can 
also occur due to a change in personal priorities (Horgan, 2009). Hwang (2015) added that 
pressure from parents, humane treatment by the police, cost-benefit calculations, feeling 
remorse and experiencing disappointments can also lead to disengagement. Bjorgo (Tore 
Bjorgo, 2009), distinguishes push and pull factors that influence one’s decision about leaving 
                                                 





Bastug & Evlek: Individual Disengagement and Deradicalization Pilot Program in Turkey: 
Methods and Outcomes 
28 
a group. While the term ‘push factors’ refers to those negative factors that make staying in a 
group unattractive, pull factors refers to those factors that encourage an individual to leave a 
group by providing them with a better alternative social environment (Bjorgo, 2009). Bjorgo 
(2009) identifies negative social sanctions, losing faith or confidence in the group, changes in 
views regarding the use of violence, disillusionment with the group, and getting exhausted as 
push factors, and a desire for a ‘normal life’ and a professional career, and establishing a 
family as examples of pull factors. He also identified some factors that make disengagement 
difficult. A fear of punishment from the group or from the criminal justice system, a loss of 
protection against the enemies of the group, a lack of bonding with family, friends or the 
society, and negative stigmatization that will prevent integration into the society or finding an 
employment situation complicates the decision to disengage (Bjorgo, 2009).  
Dalgaard-Nielsen’s (2013) review of sixteen published studies on disengagement revealed 
three main reasons for taking the decision to exit from violent extremist groups. The first 
reason is losing faith in the group’s ideology. Losing faith can be a gradual process, however 
it can also occur suddenly as a result of a dramatic event (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). The 
second reason is group and leadership failure. As with the first reason, disillusionment with 
the group or the leader can either be a gradual process, or occur as a result of a single 
experience, such as an ill treatment by the group leader (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013).  The first 
two reasons are similar to the push factors that were identified by Bjorgo (2009). However, 
the third reason, “personal and practical circumstances”, includes both push and pull factors 
such as feelings of guilty, growing older, getting exhausted and longing for a normal life 
(Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). 
 
Developing an Effective Disengagement/Deradicalization Program 
Horgan and Braddock (2010) studied the challenges in assessing the effectiveness of 
deradicalization and disengagement programs, and concluded that there are major barriers to 
evaluating those programs. They argued that there is a lack of explicit criteria for success for 
the programs, and a lack of reliable data. However, scholars suggested various criteria for 
those programs to be successful. For instance, it is argued that taking action for 
disengagement in the early stages is more likely to produce positive results (Rabasa et al., 
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disengagement. The duration that one spends in an extremist group may increase the 
likelihood of stigmatization. Additionally, a long term attachment to an extremist group may 
reduce the strength of the individual’s social bonds with the larger society. As a result, the 
duration of any association in an extremist group may incrementally decrease the willingness 
of the individual towards disengagement, thereby it can be argued that an intervention in the 
early stages of this type of engagement will be more effective than a later staged intervention.  
Rabasa et al. (2010) argued that implementing counterterrorism measures can make the 
process of disengagement more attractive, since it increases the cost of staying in the 
organization. However, they also emphasized that hard measures should be accompanied by 
soft measures in order to prevent a backfiring effect and further radicalization as a reaction to 
the hard measures. It is possible to combine these two measures. When law enforcement 
personnel carry out a counter-terrorism intervention that culminates in an arrest, this creates 
an opportunity for the law enforcement personnel to negotiate with the members of the 
extremist group. The conditions the extremists find themselves in, forces them to choose 
between compromising with the law enforcement officers and taking the risk of going to jail. 
Thus, it is important to keep in mind that it is beneficial to encourage individuals to 
participate in a deradicalization program, especially when they are in a situation where they 
tend to weigh the costs and benefits of leaving the organization (Rabasa et al., 2010). As 
mentioned above, the militant’s arrest clearly provides an opportune time for law enforcement 
officers and others to carry out an intervention to persuade that individual to leave the 
organization, since it is a traumatic event and may create a cognitive opening (Rabasa et al., 
2010). Bjorgo and Horgan (2009) suggest that after a member of an extremist group is 
arrested, rehabilitation programs can offer an option to that individual to take part in such a 
program, as an amnesty. Legislative measures that allow non-punishment, reducing sentences, 
or non-application of aggravating circumstances can play a role in disengagement efforts by 
encouraging militants to collaborate with the authorities, as these measures reduce the costs of 
leaving the extremist groups (della Porta, 2009).  
As mentioned, three types of commitment to a group (affective, pragmatic, and 
ideological commitments) have been identified in the literature. A 
disengagement/deradicalization program is more likely to succeed when it breaks all three 




Bastug & Evlek: Individual Disengagement and Deradicalization Pilot Program in Turkey: 
Methods and Outcomes 
30 
overweigh those of remaining in the group in order to sever the pragmatic attachment. Thus, 
the program needs to address the reintegration of those who disengage from an extremist 
group. Another aspect of the program should be winning the hearts of those individuals who 
have an emotional attachment to the group. Families can play a role in developing alternative 
emotional attachments. Accordingly, families should also be a part of the 
disengagement/deradicalization programs. As Rabasa et al. (2010) stated, terrorist 
organizations offer assistance to the families of their members, hence, a deradicalization 
program should also address the needs of the families. Humane treatment by the police can 
also contribute to helping to break an emotional attachment. 
Mentioned concerns were related to disengagement. However, a complete rehabilitation 
program should not focus solely on disengaging individuals from extremist groups, but also 
on changing their radical ideologies. For Bjorgo and Horgan (2009), disengagement is more 
important than deradicalization and therefore, an effective rehabilitation program should 
address the process of changing the behaviors firstly, and the ideologies, secondly. However, 
Rabasa et al. (2010) argued that a rehabilitation program that simply promotes a change in 
behavior is not likely to be a successful one; rather, it should go beyond it and trigger a 
change in an individual’s beliefs. Focusing on disengagement may be easier than 
deradicalization, however, an individual that disengages from a terrorist organization without 
changing his or her ideology may return to terrorism again if conditions change (Rabasa et al., 
2010). Thus, designing and developing a program that aims at both disengagement and 
deradicalization can be more productive in the long term than a program that restricts itself to 
breaking one’s attachment with the extremist group.  
Deradicalization is a reversal of the radicalization process (Della Porta & LaFree, 2012). 
Therefore, a rehabilitation program should carefully-assess the radicalization process of the 
targeted individuals and then develop a program that can reverse the course. For this purpose, 
it is important to take into consideration the dissimilarities between different types of 
extremist groups. Bjorgo (2011) points out that such programs should be designed in a way 
that are tailored to specifics of extremist groups. Researchers have thus described different 
methods for disengagement that are unique to each type of group. For instance, Rabasa et al. 
(2010) distinguish Islamist extremists from the members of other extremist groups in terms of 




Bastug & Evlek: Individual Disengagement and Deradicalization Pilot Program in Turkey: 
Methods and Outcomes 
31 
they believe that it is a religious obligation. They concluded that a deradicalization program 
targeting Islamist extremists should include the teaching of peaceful Islam which condemns 
terrorism, so that it can convince those radicals that renouncing extremism is not renouncing 
their faith. Examining various disengagement and deradicalization initiatives also reveals 
different approaches when treating militants from different types of extremist groups. For 
instance, while South East Asian and Middle Eastern programs focus on ideological and 
theological reeducation, European programs focus more on reintegration, and place emphasis 
on social and economic assistance in connection with disengagement (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 
2013).  
Kruglanski et al. (2014) distinguished two types of deradicalization attempt targeted 
Islamic extremists: explicit and implicit. The explicit deradicalization attempt aims at 
changing their mindset and usually carried out by Muslim clerics, who teach detainees 
moderate Islam and correct their interpretation of the holy book. Implicit deradicalization 
attempts, on the other hand, aim at facilitating the reintegration of the detainees into society. 
These types can also be applied to other terrorist groups. For instance, opinion leaders of the 
same race can play a role in changing the ideology of nationalist extremists. The core idea at 
the heart of a deradicalization program is that it triggers both a cognitive opening and helps 
them to reintegrate into society. On one side of the deradicalization effort, there should be an 
attempt to shift the radical mindset, and on the other side of the effort, there should be a social 
and economic counseling program. Rabasa et al. (2010) underscored the fact that in order to 
be an effective deradicalization program, the program should address the needs of 
rehabilitated individuals, and provide an opportunity for continued counseling. In deciding to 
leave the group, as mentioned above, individuals weigh the costs and benefits in an effort to 
decide whether it is a good idea or not to leave their group. When they believe that they can 
overcome the obstacles that occur during their reintegration into the society, they are more 
likely risk leaving the group. Thus, helping those individuals in multiple aspects of life to 
achieve a healthy integration can increase the effectiveness of both disengagement and 
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Methodology 
The data for this study was obtained from the Adana Police Department. One of the 
writers of this paper (U. K. Evlek) was a member of the program team. For this study, we 
were not allowed to use individual level data. Since we were not able to provide demographic 
information about the program participants, we could only provide general statistics including 
the number of militants from each type of extremist group and their families that were reached 
under the program, the number of program participants who disengaged from their groups, 
and the number of families who did or did not support the program. The dataset employed 
covered the year 2012 only. Thus, the results below reflect the outcomes that were achieved 
only in this one year. During the implementation phase of the program, the program team 
conducted an evaluation of the program, but the results were not documented in a publicly 
accessible manner4.  
In this report, we provide a general description of the program by identifying its key 
features and the steps involved in the disengagement process. We report and discuss the 
outcomes of the program, and compare the results between each type of extremist 
organization. We also discuss the general counterterrorism framework in Turkey, how this 
studied program fit with Turkey’s counterterrorism policies, and how political turmoil and 
dramatic shifts in counterterrorism policies in Turkey had an influence over this and other 
CVE programs.  
 
Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Turkey 
Traditionally, there are three major terrorist groups in Turkey: Marxist-Leninist, Kurdish 
separatist, and radical Islamist terrorist groups. Marxist-Leninist groups, which seek to 
establish a Marxist regime in Turkey, were predominant in 1970s and 1980s. Although there 
are still active leftist groups in Turkey, they mostly lost their power after the Cold War ended 
(Sozen, 2006). 
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (known as the PKK), is the leading terrorist group fighting 
for the foundation of an independent Kurdish state in the southeastern part of Turkey, and has 
long been the main threat to Turkey’s national security. After the leader and the founder of the 
PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured by Turkish forces in 1999, the terrorist organization 
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abandoned its initial strategy, which was aimed at establishing an independent Kurdish state, 
and adopted a new strategy that prioritized the recognition of the Kurdish identity and having 
equal rights (Yilmaz, 2011). However, the group did not stop carrying out terrorist attacks 
against Turkish security forces until a cease-fire agreement was achieved in 2013. The peace 
process (a.k.a. the solution process) enacted between the Turkish government and the PKK 
after that did not last long. The truce between the parties has always been fragile, and  real 
progress towards peace has never been accomplished (Waldman & Caliskan, 2015). In 2015, 
the so-called peace process ceased to exist, and another era of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict 
began. In this new era, the Turkish government shifted its counterterrorism strategy against 
the PKK, which they had employed during the peace process, from a soft power approach to 
waging a full scale war, which is led mostly by the army and police special operation units. 
The main factor that has influenced the peace process has been the state of affairs in Syria. 
After the civil war in Syria broke out in 2011, the Turkish government adopted a strong 
position against the Assad regime, and supported opposition groups to oust Assad. PYD, the 
PKK affiliated Kurdish group in Syria, somehow took sides with the Assad regime after the 
Syrian civil war began. The Syrian regime forces left the Kurdish dominated Syrian border 
zone with Turkey to the PYD (Hinnebusch, 2015). Since Syria hosted PKK militants, 
including Abdullah Ocalan, for a long time within its territories, the Turkish government was 
afraid of the influence that Assad would have over the PKK. To prevent a PKK-affiliated 
Kurdish zone on the Turkish-Syrian border, Turkish authorities incited jihadist groups to 
organize attacks against the PYD (Uslu, 2016). When ISIS attacked the Kurdish populated 
areas on the border, the PKK leaders blamed the Turkish government for supporting jihadist 
groups (Uslu, 2016), and this initiated waves of protests in Turkey (Dalay, 2015). 
Consequently, both sides of the peace agreement lost their trust with each other, and the 
already fragile truce was completely broken.  
The emergence of radical Islamist terrorist groups in Turkey occurred mostly after the 
Islamic revolution in Iran  in 1979 (Caglar, 2006). The early Islamist groups in Turkey were 
domestic rather than transnational. However, after 9/11, transnational Islamist terrorist 
groups, such as al-Qaeda, gained momentum and found sympathizers in Turkey. The first 
large scale al-Qaeda perpetrated terrorist attack in Europe took place in Turkey, and resulted 




Bastug & Evlek: Individual Disengagement and Deradicalization Pilot Program in Turkey: 
Methods and Outcomes 
34 
war on terrorism, and conducted an effective counterterrorism strategy against the radical 
Islamist terrorist network until 2012 (Uslu, 2016). As mentioned, Turkey took a position 
against the Assad regime, after the start of the Syrian civil war. Consequently, the government 
has turned a blind eye to radical Islamist groups, and does not pursue a set of effective 
counterterrorism policies against them, as they are fighting against Assad. Turkey’s foreign 
policy choices have made her both a source and transit country for the Islamic State in Iraq 
and Sham (ISIS) as a result. According to Uslu (2016), Turkey’s direct and indirect support 
for jihadists has turned the country into a “jihadi highway”.  
 
 
Figure 1. Number of terrorist attacks in Turkey, 2000-2005 
Data: Global Terrorism Database (START, 2016) 
 
Figure 1 shows the number of terrorist attacks in Turkey between 2000 and 2015. As the 
data revealed, the numbers of terrorist incidents increased remarkably after the Syrian civil 
war began. The numbers went down in 2013 compared to 2012, when Turkey reached a peace 
agreement with PKK. The number of incidents increased enormously in 2015 due to the end 
of the peace agreement, and the course of events in Syria. Turkey’s miscalculation regarding 
the power balances in Syria got the country stuck in a very difficult position. Turkey now 
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and trained by ISIS. Turkey has already become a target of a number of ISIS terrorist attacks. 
Besides that, the country missed the opportunity to end the decades-long Turkish-Kurdish 
conflict. The ruling party in Turkey, the AKP, and the President Erdogan were unable to oust 
the Assad regime, despite all their efforts. To sum up, it can be argued that Turkey’s 
counterterrorism policy is not stable, rather it is periodic in character. Particularly in recent 
years, it is almost in a constant state of change. Those policy changes negatively impact the 
strategies that the law enforcement agencies implement in their jurisdictions. For instance, 
may police departments had to stop counterterrorism operations against the PKK, after the 
government forged a peace agreement with the group. Similarly, they had to suspend 
deradicalization and rehabilitation programs, after the agreement was broken.  
 
The Pilot Program 
Overview of the Program 
The Disengagement and Deradicalization Pilot Program was developed in 2009 as an 
effort to disengage individuals from terrorist organizations, shift their radical ideologies, and 
reintegrate them into the society by counseling, helping in obtaining a job, and receiving 
healthcare, housing, and education. The program was first designed by the Adana Police 
Department (APD) in 2009. When the program started producing positive results, and gained 
attention, other police departments began developing similar programs, using APD’s program 
as a template. Those programs have mostly been conducted by police intelligence and 
counterterrorism units.  
The studied program targeted individuals who joined the activities of left wing, faith-
based or nationalist/separatist extremist groups. The program was a part of a broader 
countering violent extremism program conducted by the Adana Police Department (APD) and 
was supported by the National Directorate of Security. Police, local officials, and community 
leaders are involved in the program and are used as interlocutors. The city where the pilot 
program was implemented, Adana, is one of the largest cities in Turkey with a population of 
more than two million citizens. 
The program was part of a broader counterterrorism strategy, which underscored the 
importance of employing both soft and hard approaches simultaneously in the combat against 
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the hearts and minds of the militants with the help of other local institutions; and on the other 
side, they used hard power against those who did not disengage from the extremist groups 
despite all of the efforts carried out when using soft power. The disengagement and 
deradicalization program represented the soft power approach.  
There are several deradicalization programs instituted by states that aim at rehabilitating 
terrorism suspects in detention facilities (Kruglanski et al., 2014). The APD’s disengagement 
and deradicalization pilot program reaches out to suspected individuals not only in detention 
facilities or in prisons, but also at the early stages of their engagement. The program begins by 
informing and counseling individuals when they first show any inclination towards extremist 
groups. As mentioned, radicalization is a process: individuals go through, and consists of 
different stages and those who arrive the final stage become radicalized potential terrorist. 
NYPD’s radicalization model (Silber & Bhatt, 2007) identified pre-radicalization, and self-
identification stages of radicalization. In these early stages, individuals are seeking a new 
identity, and they begin associated themselves with like-minded individuals. Wiktorowicz’ 
2004 study found that those who engaged with al-Muhajiroun, a jihadist organization, 
experienced an identity crisis before their engagement (Wiktorowicz, 2004). There may be 
some visible signs of inclinations towards radicalization. Those signs can include approaching 
members of the extremist groups, or joining legal activities or demonstrations that are carried 
out by these groups to seek for a new identity. The next step would be the indoctrination 
stage, as identified by Silber and Bhatt (2007), in which they begin adopting radical 
ideologies. APD’s pilot program firstly detects those individuals who arrive this stage5. Police 
intelligence units closely monitor the activities of the extremist groups, and easily detect new 
recruits. Those new recruits may have never been involved in any illegal or terrorist activities. 
The first step of the program is to get in contact with those individuals who have recently 
joined the extremist group. Program officers get in contact with those individuals usually by 
phone, and inform them that they are at risk of being radicalized and drawn into terrorist 
activities. They are advised that if they continue to be a member of that group, they are more 
likely to engage in criminal or terrorist activity and most probably go to jail sooner or later. 
Furthermore, they are asked to meet with program officers either in the police department or 
                                                 
5 APD also aims at preventing those individuals at earlier stages from being engaged in extremist groups. 
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in another safe place that is convenient for them. At this stage they are also informed that if 
they choose to leave the group, they will be entered into a rehabilitation program in which 
they will be provided with both material and nonmaterial supports. If they choose not to leave 
the group, law enforcement personnel may start monitoring those individual more closely, as 
they are considered potential threats. At the same time, program officers make contact with 
the parents of these individuals, usually if they are young, and make them aware of their 
child’s situation. They ask those family members to cooperate with the law enforcement 
personnel to help their child disengage from the extremist groups.  
 
 
Figure 2. Steps involved in the disengagement processes 
 
The second persuasion attempt usually takes place when militants are under arrest. As 
mentioned, the situations that they are in force them to make a choice. They are informed that 




Bastug & Evlek: Individual Disengagement and Deradicalization Pilot Program in Turkey: 
Methods and Outcomes 
38 
from the group, they will have the opportunity to benefit from an amnesty depending on their 
situation. Even if they are not included in the scope of an amnesty, they will be more likely to 
obtain a concession from the prosecutor. They are also informed that besides the benefits 
resulting from lesser punishment or, in some cases, no punishment, they will also receive 
some material and nonmaterial supports, including assistance for their families, and social 
aids. When those individuals who refuse to compromise with law enforcement do not receive 
a sentence, they are re-entered into the process. If they are sentenced to a prison term, 
program officers will carry out another persuasion attempt while they are in prison. Again, if 
they choose to disengage from the group, they are entered into the rehabilitation program.  
The officers do not only meet with militants to convince them to disengage from the 
group, but also meet with their families or those who have an influence over them. Militants 
often have negative views and prejudices towards government officials. Those who could not 
persuaded by officials, can sometimes be persuaded by their families and friends. New young 
recruits to the extremist groups usually hide their engagement from their parents, as this is 
generally not approved by them. The officers get in touch with those parents, and inform them 
that their children are on a dangerous path, and they may face legal sanctions in the future, if 
they keep moving in the same direction.   
By accepting the offer from the law enforcement personnel, militants (hereafter ex-
militants) acquire, vocational training, employment, housing, healthcare, social and financial 
aids, counseling, and psychological support and treatment. They are monitored for six months 
after they accept the offer to ensure whether they have broken all their attachments with the 
group, and remain disengaged. During this six-month period, program officers keep in touch 
with ex-militants to provide them with a range of pledged material and nonmaterial supports. 
For those who reject the offer to disengage from the extremist group, and continue to be 
involved in terrorist activities, the hard power approach is implemented. 
Deradicalization and disengagement efforts within the program are not necessarily 
sequential, but are overlapping. During the meetings with militants, interlocutors do not only 
inform them about the benefits that they can receive if they leave the group, or the costs they 
have to bear if they remain, but also aim at changing their mindset. It was observed during the 
implementation of the program that when the interlocutors could win the hearts and minds of 
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organizations propagandize their members into believing that if they are arrested they will be 
maltreated or tortured. The humane treatment of the militants induces a cognitive opening. 
When they feel that the police (and the government) are sincere in helping them, they start 
questioning their own ideologies. 
As mentioned above, reversing the process of radicalization requires a good understanding 
of the motivations that drive individuals to acquire a violent extremist ideology in the first 
place. Since each terrorist organization uses different forms of motivation in efforts to recruit 
and radicalize individuals, the motivations that are used by targeted terrorist groups should be 
well examined in order to ensure the deradicalization efforts will be successful. For the 
purpose of deradicalization, this present program aimed to eliminate the motivations that 
foster radicalization. The program was designed to demotivate individuals from participating 
in the radicalization process, as well as to motivate them towards deradicalization. The 
program team had a great level of knowledge about the characteristics of the terrorist groups 
in the city, and their strategies for motivating their members. They used this knowledge to 
design specific motivations for deradicalization. A move towards moderation in radical 
beliefs is also considered a success. In some cases, the program failed to deradicalize 
militants, but succeeded in alleviating their violent ideologies to a certain degree. This is 
considered a success, because these individuals are possibly less likely to become involved in 
a terrorist attack, although they are not completely deradicalized.  
 
The Outcomes 
The data showed that the results of the program differed between each type of extremist 
group. Figure 3 revealed that the program achieved more success in influencing nationalist 
groups, followed by left-wing groups and faith-based groups, respectively. Program officers 
met with 333 nationalist militants, and were able to convince 226 of them to disengage from 
the extremist group they were associated with. It was also observed that 12 militants among 
those remaining in the group decreased their negative activities. They did not fully disengage 
from the group, though, but they did reduce their involvement with the group. Meetings 
between the officers and 74 militants in left-wing organizations resulted in the disengagement 
of 33 militants from the group. Among the remaining forty-one militants, eight of them 
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of the militants who decided to disengage from the group were new recruits, and none of the 
new recruits that met with the officers chose to stay in the group. Although the program was 
least successful among the members of faith-based groups, it proved its effectiveness even in 




Figure 3. Individuals who disengage vs. those who remain in extremist groups by group type 
 
Program officers also met with the family members of the militants to ask for their support 
for the disengagement efforts. Figure 4 shows that although the results differed between each 
type of extremist groups, the majority of the families supported the disengagement efforts. All 
of the families of the militants that were engaged in left-wing extremist groups, except one, 
supported the program. The officers met with a considerable number of families of nationalist 
militants. Out of 326 families, 316 agreed to support the program and help the officers to 
dissuade their children from remaining in the extremist groups. Families of the militants in 
faith-based groups were less supportive compared to families of those engaged in other 
groups. While nineteen families approved the program and assisted in program goals, five 
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Figure 4. Family support for disengagement efforts by group type 
 
Conclusion 
Although policing and security measures are vital in combating terrorism, taking proactive 
measures are also important in preventing the development of extremist behaviors. Preventing 
radicalization and the deradicalization of those already radicalized are two essential aspects of 
proactive counterterrorism strategies. Outcomes of the various disengagement and 
deradicalization programs that have been implemented in various countries of the world have 
shown that it is possible to change the behaviors and the beliefs of individuals who have 
embraced radical ideas, even those who have engaged in terrorist activities. 
The studied pilot program encouraged 455 militants in 2012 to disengage from being 
associated with extremist groups, and impelled them to recant their radical ideologies. The 
results of the disengagement efforts were encouraging: in that-more than sixty percent of the 
militants with whom program officers met decided to leave the group. The program employed 
a holistic approach towards disengagement, deradicalization, and reintegration. Although the 
Adana Police Department led the program, other institutions involved in the program played 
an important role. This approach seemed to be the driving factor behind the successful 
implementation of the program.  
The program had some limitations. First, there were no clear distinction between what was 
done for disengagement and what was done for deradicalization. The efforts for these two 
counterterrorism measures usually overlapped. We did not have a reliable data on the 
numbers of militants or ex-militants who were de-radicalized.  
Second, the program developed a single disengagement approach and applied that 
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design specific strategies for each type of group. Members of different extremist groups have 
different motivations. Therefore, demotivating radicals from extremist activities requires an 
approach that is unique to each type of extremist group. It would be more effective to create 
different teams for each type of group, and train the team members in accordance with their 
assigned group type, so that they can be specialized in deradicalization and disengagement for 
specific extremist groups. 
In spite of these limitations, the program was a well-designed counterterrorism effort 
which resulted in the disengagement and deradicalization of hundreds of militants. When we 
bear in mind the fact that the program was a pilot program, it will readily be seen that it would 
have produced more positive results if it could have been consistently supported by the 
government. The question that comes to mind is: “Why was this successful program 
terminated?” The answer, in short, is related to the Turkish government’s inconsistent and 
unstable policies on counterterrorism, which has changed several times over the last few 
years. In the countries in which the governmental and administrative structure is strongly 
centralized, domestic and international policies, including counterterrorism policies, are 
strictly dominated and controlled by the central government. Local governments and 
institutions are hardly involved in the decision making process, and they face many 
difficulties when they attempt to develop local counterterrorism strategies. Any change in the 
government’s counterterrorism policies can directly influence the local efforts. In the second 
half of 2015, the Turkish government shifted from a counterterrorism approach which merges 
the use of soft and hard powers, to a new approach which depends mostly on using hard 
power, especially against a Kurdish nationalist and separatist terrorist organization, called the 
PKK. After that shift, many local initiatives such as this studied one were suspended, and law 
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